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SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS
In the past few years, new applications of robots have
increased the importance of robotic reliability and fault
tolerance. Standard approaches of reliability engineering
rely on the probability model, which is often inappropriate
for this task due to a lack of sucient probabilistic infor-
mation during the design and prototyping phases. Fuzzy
logic oers an alternative to the probability paradigm, pos-
sibility, that is much more appropriate to reliability in the
robotic context.
Fuzzy Markov modeling, the technique developed in
this paper, is a technique for analyzing fault tolerant de-
signs under considerable uncertainty, such as is seen in
compilations of component failure rates. It is suciently
detailed to provide useful information while maintaining
the fuzziness (uncertainty) inherent in the situation. It
works well in conjunction with fuzzy fault trees, a well-
established fuzzy reliability tool. Perhaps most impor-
tantly, it builds directly on existing reliability techniques,
making it easy to add to our reliability toolbox.
1. INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND
The increasing desire to produce more reliable robots
has created interest in several tools used in fault-tolerant
design. The extra components needed for fault-tolerant
robot designs obviously add extra costs and extra possibil-
ities of failure. Reliability analysis tools such as fault trees
and Markov models give hard numbers showing that the
benets of the fault tolerant design are tangible and worth
the eort. Unfortunately, the component failure rates used
in these calculations are often very dependent on congura-
tion and environment, and thus known only approximately
during the design phase [12]. Some way of considering the
full range of failure rates is needed to give a good idea of
what is and isn't known.
The standard approaches of reliability engineering
rely on the probability model, which is often inappropri-
ate for this task [1, 12]. Probability based analyses usually
require more information about the system than is known,
such as mean failure rates, or failure rate distributions.
Commonly, this results in dubious assumptions about the
original data. Thus, any single value or distribution ap-
plied to the failure characteristics is likely to give a result
that is misleading.
Fuzzy logic oers an alternative to the probability
paradigm, possibility, that is much more appropriate to
reliability in the robotic context [1, 12]. Possibility math-
ematics allows for quantitative reliability calculations that
preserve the uncertainty present in the original data. The
possibility model deals with uncertainty in a way that
avoids making unwarranted assumptions, and makes the
consequences of the required assumptions clear.
Of the common reliability tools, only fault tree tech-
niques have been fuzzified to any great extent. However,
while these are very useful, they are somewhat limited in
their applications. Partial failures, coverage, repairable
systems, and other important reliability issues are not cov-
ered well by fault trees, although recent developments in
fault tree analysis are expanding their range of applica-
tion [4, 5]. Markov modeling is a valuable tool for dealing
with the above situations. Unfortunately, previous fuzzy
Markov models have used a fuzzy integral method, which
will be shown here to be inappropriate for reliability anal-
ysis.
2. CONSTRUCTION OF A FUZZY MARKOV MODEL
The Markov model is a method of determining sys-
tem behavior by using information about certain probabil-
ities of events within the system. However, in reliability, it
is often necessary to estimate these probabilities. A com-
mon approach is to estimate a single crisp probability and
assume that it is sucient. A more sophisticated approach
would be to assign a probability distribution to each of
these probabilities, resulting in probabilities of probabili-
ties. As discussed previously, these assumptions are often
inappropriate.
A classical reliability Markov model breaks the pos-
sible congurations of the system into a number of states.
Each of these states is connected to all the other states by a
crisp transition rate. The probability of being in each state
(or population of that state) evolves over time according to
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these rates. For the fuzzy Markov models introduced in
this paper, both the populations and the transition rates
will be fuzzy.
Our approach is to estimate the conservative and
optimistic bounds of the probabilities in question, and use
them to dene a trapezoidal membership function. This
estimate is reasonably easy to perform for most systems,
and has the benet of being clear cut and easy to under-
stand and modify. We will use the conservative bounds for
the base, and the optimistic bounds for the top, as seen in
gure 1. The resulting output for our fuzzy Markov model
is three dimensional, with axes of probability, degree of
membership (possibility), and time. However, this can be
reduced to two dimensions if we only plot the corners, or
breakpoints, of the possibility distribution (points A-D in
gure 1).
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Figure 1: Output Format for a Fuzzy Markov Model.
There are several important requirements that our
fuzzy Markov model must fulll. The most obvious of
these is that it must be better in some way than the crisp
(standard) Markov model. This requirement is met by the
fuzzy nature of the model, as long as our fuzzy reliability
models preserve the uncertainty accurately and reliably
throughout the calculation. This requirement will be re-
ferred to as the uncertainty criterion.
Another important factor to consider is complexity.
The fuzzy Markov model is likely to be more complex than
a crisp Markov model, as the former uses a fuzzy possibil-
ity distribution where the latter has single crisp values.
Ideally, the graphic simplication shown in gure 1 will
also apply to the mathematics, but this is not guaranteed
when multiple distributions interact. The desire to keep
the model simple will be referred to as the complexity cri-
terion.
The nal criterion that any new fuzzy Markov Model
will be judged on is `niceness'. A model that gives illogi-
cal, unintuitive, or overly complex output is not likely to
be a good model. Although it can be hard to precisely de-
ne `niceness', it is usually not hard to achieve consensus
that certain models are not `nice'. Additionally, several
mathematical `niceness' criteria are obvious, resulting in
tests that exclude a model from being nice. The rst of
these, fuzzy niceness, tests to see if the fuzzy output of
the model is a `nice' fuzzy set. For our purposes, any valid
continuous function bounded on the [0; 1] interval is `nice'
[6]. The other criterion is probabilistic niceness. The re-
quirement here is that we do not ever have any possibility
greater than zero of probabilities outside of the [0; 1] in-
terval. Thus both the domain and range are eectively
bounded. However, we will relax the probabilistic axiom
`the sum of all probabilities equals one', as for our fuzzy
numbers this can only be true in a fuzzy sense.
One possible fuzzication of the Markov model
would use methods similar to those used for fuzzy fault
trees, where it can be sucient to propagate the extremal
values through the fault tree as if it were crisp, and take
the resulting extremal points as the output possibility dis-
tribution [6, 11, 12]. Unfortunately, this method is not suf-
cient for a good fuzzy Markov model, as it is valid only
for trivial Markov systems. It is easy to set up a Markov
model where propagation on extremal values results in the
problem seen in gure 2.
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Figure 2: Extreme Values Fail to Produce a Valid Fuzzy
Markov Model.
At the point that the two curves cross, the model
says that there is no uncertainty in the population of the
state. It can be shown that this is not true if one consid-
ers the continuum of the possibility distribution, so this
method violates the uncertainty criterion described above.
The generalization of a crisp binary operation to a
fuzzy operation can be accomplished via the extension
principle, as presented in [8, 11]. It is natural to try to
use the extension principle to fuzzify crisp Markov mod-
els. The model is simply solved as if it were crisp, using
symbolic constants for the failure probabilities. The re-
sulting equations are then fuzzied by substituting fuzzy
possibilities for the probability constants and fuzzy oper-
ations for crisp ones.
Although theoretically promising, it was quickly de-
termined that this approach violated the probabilistic nice-
ness criterion - i.e. it resulted in nonzero possibilities for
impossible probabilities. A typical result of this approach
is seen in gure 3.
This is a property of the discretization of the fuzzy
math itself. This impossible situation is generated because
the fuzzy arithmetic uses the most extreme possible proba-
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Figure 3: Extension Principle-Based Fuzzy Markov Model.
bility in each stage of the calculation, not caring if dierent
probabilities are used for the same value or if the proba-
bilities in question do not add up to one. It was dicult
to modify fuzzy mathematics to force compliance with the
additivity property. All of the attempts made to do so re-
sulted in logical self-contradiction, total loss of fuzziness,
or unacceptable loss of information.
As seen in [9], some work has been done in the eld
of fuzzy Markov modeling using the concept of the fuzzy
integral. It would be useful if this work could be adapted
to reliability. Unfortunately, this is not the case. The
problem lies in the fuzzy integral. Although a fuzzy inte-
gral takes the fuzzy possibility of a fuzzy event, the result
of such an integral is crisp [9]! Although this may be a
logical approach in some instances, it is not appropriate
for the problem considered here. The uncertainty crite-
rion is clearly not satised for the fuzzy integral, where
the arguments are uncertain but the results are not. The
uncertainty in the situation has been lost.
Previously, we considered the approach where we
solved for the extremal values of the trapezoidal member-
ship function. It is natural to consider what would happen
if we considered all of the values in between as well. This
approach attacks the problem from rst principles, follow-
ing the general denition of interval extension in [10]. If
the failure rate is within a certain interval, we can deter-
mine the possible behavior of the system by examining the
behavior of the models resulting from every possible value
on this interval.
Of course, this approach has its own problems. Since
an interval contains an innite number of points, one needs
an innite number of Markov models to solve the prob-
lem. This is clearly impossible, but if one assumes some
smoothness, one can reduce this to a close sampling of
these values instead of a continuum. Areas on the popula-
tion graph that are between dierent plots can be assumed
to be covered by some probability value between the values
that resulted in those plots. Complexity for this approach
is still high, but a solution to the problem is now possible,
as seen in gure 4, where six crisp Markov models are used
to determine one fuzzy model.
Despite its brute force nature, this approach meets
all of our requirements listed for the fuzzy Markov model
except for one - complexity. Close sampling requires that
many crisp Markov models be solved to solve a single fuzzy
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Figure 4: Fuzzy Markov Modeling Through Close Sam-
pling Method.
Markov model. If one is taking N samples on the interval,
and there are M fuzzy failure rates, N
M
crisp Markov
models must be solved. As N is typically on the order of
5-20, this can quickly grow to an unreasonable number of
calculations.
This close sampling approach is the method used
here to calculate fuzzy Markov models. Despite the com-
plexity issue, it is the only method found that has neither
lost the important information nor resulted in impossible
or useless output. Thus, the original problem of nding
a fuzzy Markov model has become the problem of simpli-
fying and implementing the close sampling fuzzy Markov
model.
In systems with many similar components in similar
roles, this can be accomplished by grouping the failures
of these components together in the Markov model. In-
stead of having a state representing `pressure sensor 23 has
failed', for example, we have `a pressure sensor has failed'.
Provided the failure of any single sensor has a similar eect
on the system, this is a valid simplication. This often also
allows us to use a single possibility distribution for all of
the similar components, cutting down the number of crisp
Markov models that need to be solved considerably.
A complex system with many dierent parts will
probably have many fuzzy failure rates to deal with, more
than enough to make a fuzzy Markov model impractical.
However, when examining the failure characteristics of any
complex system, we are quite likely to organize it into sub-
systems. This increases our understanding of the system.
For example, if we were examining the failure characteris-
tics of a robot arm, we might want to consider joint failures
in our primary analysis. Once we knew those character-
istics, we could then sharpen our focus to a model of the
individual joints, considering motor, sensor, and mechani-
cal failures, and so forth. This type of simplication comes
naturally and is helpful in promoting greater understand-
ing of the system.
We can use the natural scheme of organization above
to simplify our fuzzy Markov models. All we need to do
is nd a way to group the failure rates of the individual
components into a single component failure rate. Fuzzy
fault trees are ideal for this purpose. They are easy to
implement, fuzzy mathematically sound, and specically
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designed to determine failure rates for collections of com-
ponents. Fuzzy Markov modeling using fuzzy fault trees
for simplication shows promise as a reliability tool, as
seen in the next section.
3. AN EXAMPLE: THE MLDUA ROBOT SYSTEM
The Modied Light Duty Utility Arm, (MLDUA),
is a robot arm designed to assist in the removal of haz-
ardous radioactive waste from large underground storage
tanks at Oak Ridge National Laboratory [2, 7]. The ML-
DUA is inserted through a narrow central access riser, and
used to manipulate a `hose management system' for waste
extraction, as seen in gure 5.
MLDUA
vertical
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mast
waste
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management 
system
containment
systems
hazardous
waste
Figure 5: MLDUA Manipulator in Waste Tank.
The environment in these tanks is extremely hos-
tile, and the waste involved is too hazardous to allow leak-
age. Thus the MLDUA system has to meet many stringent
safety requirements [2]. The environment inside the tank
is so hostile that the MLDUA itself is endangered. Ex-
tremely high radiation levels combine with explosive and
corrosive chemicals to make eventual damage to the ML-
DUA a virtual certainty. However, the overall eect cannot
be predicted accurately before deployment. Stringent re-
liability requirements and uncertain failure characteristics
thus combine to make the MLDUA system an ideal real
world test case for fuzzy reliability analysis.
Considerable reliability work has already been done
for the MLDUA. The design itself is very reliability con-
scious. Each joint is monitored by two redundant sensors.
There are seven joints, allowing the MLDUA to continue
working after a single joint failure (kinematic redundancy).
Five of these joints are powered by hydraulic motors con-
nected to a `limping system', which will allow the robot to
be straightened out and removed from the tank without
power. This is an important consideration, as the robot
arm is inserted through a narrow riser and must be `limp'
(straight) to remove from the tank. However, due to the
hazardousness of the tank's contents, only severely limited
options are available for in-tank repair if the system fails
[6].
A fault tree analysis of the MLDUA system has been
done by our group [2]. This analysis considers the overall
Component Failure Rate
Bearing 0.00291
Electric Motor 0.0092
Electronic Timer 0.0012
Hydraulic Motor 0.540
Hydraulic Pump 0.0470
Hydraulic Valve 0.00882
Mechanical Brake 0.1386
Optical Encoder 0.0155
Power Supply 0.0137
Rotary Joint 0.0075
Sensor, General 0.00361
Sensor, Level, Liquid 0.0026
Sensor, Pressure 0.00923
Sensor, Temperature 0.00182
Strainer (lter) 0.00019
Table 1: MLDUA Component Failure Rates Per 1000
hours.
failure of the MLDUA system as well as tracking numerous
lesser failures as subsidiary events. The events of interest
are component failures that lead to failure of the MLDUA
while operating in the tank. Power system failure, joint
failure, braking system failure, servo control failure, and
limping system failure are all considered as separate events
modeled by trees, as found in [2].
Table 1 gives typical mean failure rates in failures
per thousand hours of operation found in [3] for the com-
ponents of these fault trees. These are fuzzied as appro-
priate [6, 12] before use in the fault tree. (This is based
on a simple proportional operation, so these values are not
shown). Also, the frequencies of several events, such as
pressure errors in the hydraulic system were not known at
all. For these, a fuzzy representation of `unknown' is used.
Fuzzy Markov modeling of the MLDUA system is of
interest to us due to the importance of the order of occur-
rence of some of the system failures. Two cases are consid-
ered. In the rst, the operator runs the MLDUA for up to
ten hours at a time, stopping only in case of total system
failure. The second case considers a conservative operator
who removes the MLDUA shortly after any joint failure,
despite the kinematic redundancy, in order to avoid a sub-
sequent failure combined with a limping failure resulting
in a trapped robot. Between uses, the strict maintenance
schedule of the robot is expected to return it to an undam-
aged condition. The failure rates for both situations are
calculated using fuzzy fault trees [6] (not shown). Figure 6
shows the Markov model used for both of these cases. The
results of these two models, are seen in gure 7. (Note
that the lower bounds of some of the log plots are o the
bottom of the scale.)
The rst thing one notices is the high possibility that
the MLDUA will not survive through a ten hour working
day without a work halting failure (state F). This is not
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Figure 6: MLDUA Manipulator Markov Model.
good news, but it is not surprising, considering the com-
plex nature of the system and hostile environment. Careful
daily maintenance should help with this problem.
One can also note that the possible probabilities for
the `trapped' state (state T) are fairly low for both Markov
models, with worst-case values on the order of one in ten
thousand. This may or may not be an acceptable risk level,
depending on expected frequency of use and on the eec-
tiveness of contingency plans for dealing with this failure.
It is also interesting to consider the fact that while
a conservative operator decreases the chance of being
trapped (state T) considerably (nearly half an order of
magnitude), this event still happens. This is due to the
possibility of instant failures such as power or brake fail-
ure, which do not give the operator time to remove the
robot arm. Note also that the nonconservative operator
gets more working time in the tank, as the other operator
voluntarily enters state F if anything goes wrong.
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Figure 7: Log Plots of State Populations for Nonconserva-
tive (Left) and Conservative (Right) Operators. Vertical
scale is 10
 5
to 10
0
, horizontal scale is 0 to 10 hours.
4. PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
The main drawback of the fuzzy Markov modeling
method presented in this paper is its computational com-
plexity. The complexity of the model increases exponen-
tially with the number of fuzzy possibility distributions be-
ing considered. Currently, only simple or simpliedmodels
are solvable in a reasonable amount of time.
Future work in the area of fuzzy Markov modeling is
likely to focus on four areas. The rst and most obvious of
these is reduction of the computational complexity of the
model. Similarly, further methods of simplication of the
model should be considered. Additionally, Markov model-
ing is a very broad area, and expanding this technique to
some of the modied Markov models shows promise. Fi-
nally, application of this technique to other systems is an
interesting research issue.
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